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Abstract
Proving ownership rights on outsourced relational databases is a crucial issue in today
internet-based application environments and in many content distribution applications.
In this paper, we present a mechanism for proof of ownership based on the secure em-
bedding of a robust imperceptible watermark in relational data. We formulate the wa-
termarking of relational databases as a constrained optimization problem, and discuss
ecient techniques to solve the optimization problem and to handle the constraints.
Our watermarking technique is resilient to watermark synchronization errors because
it uses a partitioning approach that does not require marker tuples. Our approach
overcomes a major weakness in previously proposed watermarking techniques. Water-
mark decoding is based on a threshold-based technique characterized by an optimal
threshold that minimizes the probability of decoding errors. We implemented a proof
of concept implementation of our watermarking technique and showed by experimental
results that our technique is resilient to tuple deletion, alteration and insertion attacks.
Keywords: Watermarking, Digital Rights, Optimization.
11 Introduction
The rapid growth of internet and related technologies has oered an unprecedented ability
to access and redistribute digital contents. In such a context, enforcing data ownership
is an important requirement which requires articulated solutions, encompassing technical,
organizational and legal aspects [25]. Though we are still far from such comprehensive
solutions, in the last years watermarking techniques have emerged as an important building
block which plays a crucial role in addressing the ownership problem. Such techniques allow
the owner of the data to embed an imperceptible watermark into the data. A watermark
describes information that can be used to prove the ownership of data, such as the owner,
origin, or recipient of the content. Secure embedding requires that the embedded watermark
must not be easily tampered with, forged, or removed from the watermarked data [26].
Imperceptible embedding means that the presence of the watermark is unnoticeable in the
data. Furthermore, the watermark detection is blinded ,that is, it neither requires the
knowledge of the original data nor the watermark. Watermarking techniques have been
developed for video, images, audio, and text data [24, 12, 15, 2], and also for software and
natural language text [7, 3].
By contrast the problem of watermarking relational data has not been given appropriate
attention. There are, however, many application contexts for which data represent an im-
portant asset, the ownership of which must thus be carefully enforced. This is the case, for
example, of weather data, stock market data, power consumption, consumer behavior data,
medical and scientic data. Watermark embedding for relational data is made possible by
the fact that real data can very often tolerate a small amount of error without any signicant
degradation with respect to their usability. For example when dealing with weather data,
changing some daily temperatures of 1 or 2 degrees is a modication that leaves the data
still usable.
To date only a few approaches to the problem of watermarking relational data have been
proposed [1, 23]. These techniques, however, are not very resilient to watermark attacks. In
this paper, we present a watermarking technique for relational data that is highly resilient
compared to these techniques. In particular, our proposed technique is resilient to tuple dele-
2tion, alteration, and insertion attacks. The main contributions of the paper are summarized
as follows:
 We formulate the watermarking of relational databases as a constrained optimization
problem, and discuss ecient techniques to handle the constraints. We present two
techniques to solve the formulated optimization problem based on genetic algorithms
and pattern search techniques.
 We present a data partitioning technique that does not depend on marker tuples to
locate the partitions and thus it is resilient to watermark synchronization errors.
 We develop an ecient technique for watermark detection that is based on an optimal
threshold. The optimal threshold is selected by minimizing the probability of decoding
error.
 With a proof of concept implementation of our watermarking technique, we have con-
ducted experiments using both synthetic and real-world data. We have compared our
watermarking technique with previous approaches [1, 23] and shown the superiority of
our technique with respect to all types of attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work which includes
the available relational database watermarking techniques and highlights the shortcomings
of these techniques. An overview of our watermarking technique is described in Section 3,
where an overview of the watermark encoding and decoding stages is presented. Section 4
discusses the data partitioning algorithm. The watermark embedding algorithm is described
in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the decoding threshold evaluation and the watermark
detection scheme. Section 8 presents the attacker model. The experimental results are
presented in Section 9. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 10.
2 Related Work
Agrawal et al. [1] proposed a watermarking algorithm that embeds the watermark bits in
the least signicant bits (LSB) of selected attributes of a selected subset of tuples. This
3technique does not provide a mechanism for multibit watermarks; instead only a secret key
is used. For each tuple, a secure message authenticated code (MAC) is computed using the
secret key and the tuples primary key. The computed MAC is used to select candidate
tuples, attributes and the LSB position in the selected attributes. Hiding bits in LSB is
ecient. However, the watermark can be easily compromised by very trivial attacks. For
example a simple manipulation of the data by shifting the LSBs one position easily leads
to watermark loss without much damage to the data. Therefore the LSB-based data hiding
technique is not resilient [21, 8]. Moreover, it assumes that the LSB bits in any tuple can
be altered without checking data constraints. Simple unconstrained LSB manipulations can
easily generate undesirable results such as changing the age from 20 to 21. Li et al. [18]
have presented a technique for ngerprinting relational data by extending Agrawal et al.s
watermarking scheme.
Sion et al. [23] proposed a watermarking technique that embeds watermark bits in the
data statistics. The data partitioning technique used is based on the use of special marker
tuples which makes it vulnerable to watermark synchronization errors resulting from tuple
deletion and tuple insertion; thus such technique is not resilient to deletion and insertion at-
tacks. Furthermore, Sion et al. recommend storing the marker tuples to enable the decoder
to accurately reconstruct the underlying partitions; however this violates the blinded wa-
termark detection property. A detailed discussion of such attacks is presented in Section 8.
The data manipulation technique used to change the data statistics does not systematically
investigate the feasible region; instead a naive unstructured technique is used which does not
make use of the feasible alterations that could be performed on the data without aecting
its usability. Furthermore, Sion et al. proposed a threshold technique for bit decoding that
is based on two thresholds. However, the thresholds are arbitrarily chosen without any opti-
mality criteria. Thus the decoding algorithm exhibits errors resulting from the non-optimal
threshold selection, even in the absence of an attacker.
Gross-Amblard [11] proposed a watermarking technique for XML documents and theo-
retically investigates links between query result preservation and acceptable watermarking
alterations. Another interesting related research eort is to be found in [17] where the au-
thors have proposed a fragile watermark technique to detect and localize alterations made
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Figure 1: Stages of watermark encoding and decoding.
to a database relation with categorical attributes.
3 Approach Overview
Figure 1 shows a block diagram summarizing the main components of the watermarking
system model used. A data set D is transformed into a watermarked version DW by applying
a watermark encoding function that also takes as inputs a secret key Ks only known to the
copyright owner and a watermark W. Watermarking modies the data. However these
modications are controlled by providing usability constraints referred to by the set G.
These constraints limit the amount alterations that can be performed on the data, such
constraints will be discussed in detail in the following sections. The watermark encoding can
be summarized by the following three steps:
Step E1. Data set partitioning: by using the secret key Ks the data set D is partitioned
into m non-overlapping partitions {S0,...,S m  1}.
Step E2. Watermark embedding: a watermark bit is embedded in each partition by altering
the partition statistics while still verifying the usability constraints in G. This alteration is
performed by solving a constrained optimization problem.
Step E3. Optimal threshold evaluation: the bit embedding statistics are used to compute
the optimal threshold T  that minimizes the probability of decoding error.
The watermarked version DW is delivered to the intended recipient. Then it can suer
from unintentional distortions or attacks aimed at destroying the watermark information.
Note that even intentional attacks are performed without any knowledge of Ks or D,s i n c e
these are not publicly available.
5Watermark decoding is the process of extracting the embedded watermark using the
watermarked data set DW, the secret key Ks and the optimal threshold T . The decoding
algorithm is blind as the original data set D is not required for the successful decoding of
the embedded watermark. The watermark decoding is divided into three main steps:
Step D1. Data set partitioning: by using the data partitioning algorithm used in E1,t h e
data partitions are generated.
Step D2. Threshold based decoding: the statistics of each partition are evaluated and the
embedded bit is decoded using a threshold based scheme based on the optimal threshold T .
Step D3. Majority voting: The watermark bits are decoded using a majority voting tech-
nique.
In the following sections we discuss each of the encoding and decoding steps in detail.
4 Data Partitioning
In this section we present the data partitioning algorithm that partitions the data set based
on a secret key Ks. The data set D is a database relation with scheme D(P,A0,...,A  1),
where P is the primary key attribute, A0,...,A  1are  attributes which are candidates for
watermarking and |D| is the number of tuples in D. The data set D is to be partitioned into
m non-overlapping partitions namely {S0,...,S m  1}, such that each partition Si contains
on average
|D|
m tuples from the data set D. Partitions do not overlap, that is, for any two
partitions Si and Sj such that i = j we have Si  Sj = {}. For each tuple r  D the data
partitioning algorithm computes a message authenticated code (MAC) which is considered to
be secure [22] and is given by H(Ks||H(r.P||Ks)), where r.P is the primary key of the tuple
r, H() is a secure hash function and || is the concatenation operator. Using the computed
MAC tuples are assigned to partitions. For a tuple r its partition assignment is given by
partition(r)=H( K s ||H(r.P||Ks)) mod m
Using the property that secure hash functions generate uniformly distributed message digests
this partitioning technique on average places
|D|
m tuples in each partition. Furthermore, an
attacker cannot predict the tuples-to-partition assignment without the knowledge of the
6secret key Ks and the number of partitions m which are kept secret. Keeping m secret is
not a requirement. However, keeping it secret makes it harder for the attacker to regenerate
the partitions. The partitioning algorithm is described in Figure 2.
Though the presence of a primary key in the relation being watermarked is a common
practice in relational data, our technique can be easily extended to handle cases when the
relation has no primary key. Assuming a single attribute relation, the most signicant  bits
(MSB) of the data could be used as a substitute for the primary key. The use of the MSB
assumes that the watermark embedding data alterations will unlikely alter the MSB  bits.
However, if too many tuples share the same MSB  bits this would enable the attacker to
infer information about the partition distribution. The solution would be to select  that
minimizes the duplicates. Another technique, in case of a relation with multiple attributes
is to use identifying attributes instead of the primary key; for example in medical data we
could use the patient full name, patient address, patient date of birth.
Our data partitioning algorithm does not rely on special marker tuples for the selection
of data partitions, which makes it resilient to watermark synchronization attacks caused by
tuple deletion and tuple insertion. By contrast, Sion et al. [23] use special marker tuples,
having the property that H(Ks||H(r.P||Ks)) mod m = 0, to partition the data set. In
Sions approach a partition is dened as the set of tuples between two markers. Marker-
based techniques not only use markers to dene partitions but also to dene boundaries
between the embedded watermark bits. Such a technique is very fragile to tuple deletion
and insertion due to the errors caused by the addition and deletion of marker tuples. This
attack is discussed in more detail in Section 8.
Algorithm: get partitions
Input: Data set D, Secret Key Ks, Number of partitions m
Output: Data partitions S0,...,S m  1
1. S0,...,S m  1{ }
2. for each Tuple r  D,
3. partition(r)  H(Ks||H(r.P||Ks)) mod m
4. insert r into Spartition(r)
5. return S0,...,S m  1
Figure 2: Data partitioning algorithm
7Symbol Description
m Number of data partitions
 Minimum partition size
W Watermark bit sequence {bl1,...,b 0}
l Length of watermark bit sequence
Xmax Maximization embedding statistics
Xmin Minimization embedding statistics
Si Data partition, numeric data vector in Rn
|Si|,n Length of vector Si
Ks Secret Key
T  Optimal decoding threshold
Gi Usability constraints
i Manipulation vector in Rn
Figure 3: Notation
5 Watermark Embedding
In this section we describe the watermark embedding algorithm by formalizing the bit en-
coding as a constrained optimization problem. Then we propose a genetic algorithm and
a pattern search technique that can be used to eciently solve such optimization problem.
The selection of which optimization algorithm to use is decided according to the application
time and processing requirements as will be discussed further. At the end of this section
we give the overall watermark embedding algorithm. Our watermarking technique is able to
handle tuples with multiple attributes as we will discuss in Section 7. However, to simplify
the following discussion we assume the tuples in a partition Si contain a single numeric
attribute. In such a case each partition Si can be represented as a numeric data vector
Si =[ s i 1 ,...,s in]  n .
5.1 Single Bit Encoding
Given a watermark bit bi, and a numeric data vector Si =[ s i 1 ,...,s in]  nthe bit en-
coding algorithm maps the data vector Si to a new data vector SW
i = Si + i ,w here
i =[  i 1 ,..., in]  nis referred to as the manipulation vector. The performed manipu-
lations are bounded by the data usability constraints referred to by the set Gi = {gi1,...,g ip}.
The encoding is based on optimizing encoding function referred to as the hiding function
8which is dened as follows:
Denition 1 A hiding function  : n  ,w here  is the set of secret parameters
decided by the data owner.
The set  can be regarded as part of the secret key. Note that when the hiding function
is applied to Si + ithe only variable is the manipulation vector i, while Si and  are
constants. To encode bit bi into set Si the bit encoding algorithm optimizes the hiding
function (Si+i). The objective of the optimization problem of maximizing or minimizing
the hiding function is based on the bit bi such that if the bit bi is equal to 1 then the bit
encoding algorithm solves the following maximization problem:
max
i (Si + i)
subject to Gi
However, if the bit bi is equal to 0, then the problem is simply changed into a minimization
problem. The solution to the optimization problem generates the manipulation vector 
i
at which (Si + 
i)i so ptimal. The new data set SW
i is computed as Si + 
i.U s i n g
contradicting objectives, namely maximization for bi = 1 and minimization for bi =0 ,
ensures that the values of (Si + 
i)g enerated in both cases are located at maximal
distance and thus makes the inserted bit more resilient to attacks, in particular to alteration
attacks.
Figure 4 depicts the bit encoding algorithm. The bit encoding algorithm embeds bit bi
in the partition Si if |Si| is greater than . The value of  represents the minimum partition
size. The maximize and minimize in the bit encoding algorithm optimize the hiding function
(Si + 
i)s ubject to the constraints in Gi. The maximization and minimization solution
statistics are recorded for each encoding step in Xmax, Xmin respectively as indicated in lines
4 and 7 of the encoding algorithm. These statistics are used to compute optimal decoding
parameters as will be discussed in Section 6.
The set of usability constraints Gi represents the bounds on the tolerated change that
can be performed on the elements of Si. These constraints describe the feasible space for the
manipulation vector i for each bit encoding step. These constraints are application and data
dependent. The usability constraints are similar to the constraints enforced on watermarking
9Algorithm: encode single bit
Input: Data set Si, Bit bi, Constraints set Gi, Secret parameters set ,
Statistics Xmax,Xmin
Output: Data set Si + 
i
1. if (|Si| < ) then return Si
2. if (bi == 1) then
3. maximize((Si + i)) subject to constraints Gi
4. insert (Si + 
i) into Xmax
5. else
6. minimize((Si + i)) subject to constraints Gi
7. insert (Si + 
i) into Xmin
8. return Si + 
i
Figure 4: Bit encoding algorithm
algorithms for audio, images and video which mainly require that the watermark is not
detectable by the human auditory and visual system [24, 12, 15, 8]. For example, interval
constraints could be used to control the magnitude of the alteration for ij, that is,

min
ij  ij  
max
ij
Another example of usability constraints are classication-preserving constraints which con-
strain the encoding alterations to generate data that belong to the same classication as
the original data. For example, when watermarking age data the results after the alteration
should fall in the same age group e.g. preschool (0-6 years), child (7-13), teenager
(14-18), young male (19-21), adult (22+), these constraints can be easily described using
interval constraints as they are similar to dening bounds on i. Another interesting type
of constraints may require that the watermarked data set maintain certain statistics. For
example the mean of the generated data set be equal to mean of the original data set, in
such a case the constructed constraint is of the form:
n 
j=1
ij =0
Several other usability constraints could be devised depending on the application require-
ments. These constraints are handled by the bit encoding algorithm by using constrained
optimization techniques when optimizing the hiding function as will be discussed in the
subsequent sections.
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Figure 5: The distribution of the set Si + ion the number line and the tail entries circled.
The hiding function used in this paper is dependent on the data statistics. The mean
and variance estimates of the new set SW
i = Si + iare referred to as µ(Si+i) and 2
(Si+i)
respectively; for short we will use µ and 2. We dene the reference point as ref = µ+c×,
where c  (0,1) is a secret real number which is part of the set . The data points in Si+i
that are above ref are referred to as thetail entries as illustrated by Figure 5. The hiding
function c is dened as the number of tail entries normalized by the cardinality of Si, also
referred to as the normalized tail count. It is computed as follows:
c(Si + i)=
1
n
n 
j=1
1{sij+ijref}
where, n is the cardinality of Si and 1{} is the indicator function dened as follows:
1{condition} =



1i f condition = TRUE,
0 otherwise.
Note that the reference ref is dependent on both µ and  which means that it is not xed
and dynamically varies with the statistics of Si + i . Also note that, the normalized tail
count c(Si + i)d epends on the distribution of Si + iand the dynamic ref.
The objective function c(Si+i) is nonlinear and nondierentiable, which makes the op-
timization problem at hand a nonlinear constrained optimization problem. In such problems
traditional gradient-based approaches turn out to be inapplicable. To solve this optimiza-
tion problem we propose two techniques based on Genetic Algorithm and Pattern Search
respectively. The choice of the technique to use depends on the application processing re-
quirements. Solving the optimization problem does not necessarily require to nd a global
solution because nding such solution may require a large number of computations. Our
main goal is to nd a near optimal solution that ensures that solutions of the minimization
of c(Si + i)a nd maximization of c(Si + i)a re separated as far as possible from each
other. As we will discuss further, GA could be used in order to determine global optimal
solutions by trading processing time, while Pattern Search could be used to provide a local
11optimal solution without trading processing time. Note that these optimization techniques
will function for simpler hiding functions. However, having a simple linear hiding function
makes it easier to attack. For example, if the average is used as the hiding function, in this
case the optimization problem will merely be adding or subtracting a constant term to the
data vector to maximize or minimize the average.
5.2 Genetic Algorithm Technique
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a search technique that is based on the principles of natural
selection or survival of the ttest. Pioneering work in this eld was conducted by Holland
in the 1960s [13, 6]. Many researchers have rened his initial approach. Instead of using
gradient information, the GA uses the objective function directly in the search. The GA
searches the solution space by maintaining a population of potential solutions. Then, by
using evolving operations such as crossover, mutation, and selection, the GA creates suc-
cessive generations of solutions that evolve and inherit the positive characteristics of their
parents and thus gradually approach optimal or near-optimal solutions. By using the ob-
jective function directly in the search, GAs can be eectively applied in nonconvex, highly
nonlinear, complex problems [10, 5]. GAs have been frequently used to solve combinatorial
optimization problems and nonlinear problems with complicated constraints or nondieren-
tiable objective functions. A GA is not guaranteed to nd the global optimum; however it
is less likely to get trapped at a local optimum than traditional gradient-based search meth-
ods when the objective function is not smooth and generally well behaved. A GA usually
analyzes a larger portion of the solution space than conventional methods and is therefore
more likely to nd feasible solutions in heavily constrained problems.
The feasible set i is the set of values of i that satisfy all constraints in Gi. GAs
do not work directly with points in the set i, but rather with a mapping of the points
in i into a string of symbols called chromosomes. A simple binary representation scheme
uses symbols from {0,1}; each chromosome is L symbols long. As an example the binary
chromosome representing the vector i =[  i 1 ,..., in] is indicated in Figure 6. Note that
each component of i uses L/n bits, where n = |Si|. This chromosome representation
automatically handles interval constraints on i. For example if ij can only take values in
12the interval [lij,h ij], then by mapping the integers in the interval [0,2L/n1] to values in the
interval [lij,h ij] via simple translation and scaling, this ensures that, whatever operations
are performed on the chromosome, the entries are guaranteed to stay within the feasible
interval.
0101010101010101   1111111111111111   ···0011001100110011   
i1 i2 ···  in
Figure 6: Binary chromosome representing i
Each chromosome has a corresponding value of the objective function, referred to as the
tness of the chromosome. To handle other types of constraints we penalize the infeasible
chromosomes by reducing their tness value according to a penalty function (i), which
represents the degree of infeasibility. Without loss of generality, if we are solving the maxi-
mization problem in Section 5.1 with constraints Gi = {gi1,...,g ip}, then the tness function
used is c(Si + i )+ (i), where   is the penalty multiplier and is chosen large
enough to penalize the objective function in case of infeasible i. The penalty function
(i) is given by:
(i)=
p 
j =1
g
+
ij(i)
where
g
+
ij(i)=



0i f  i is feasible w.r.t gij
(gij,i) otherwise
where (gij,i)  +represents the amount of infeasibility with respect to the constraint
gij. For example if the constraint gij is
	n
j=1 ij = 0 then (gij,i)= 
	 n
j =1 ij . For a
detailed discussion of penalty based techniques the interested reader is referred to [20, 5].
A GA is less likely to get stuck in local optima. However, a GA requires a large number of
functional evaluations to converge to a global optimal. Thus we recommend the use of GAs
only when the processing time is not a strict requirement and watermarking is performed
oine. For faster performance we recommend the use of pattern search techniques discussed
in the next section.
135.3 Pattern Search Technique
Pattern search methods are a class of direct search methods for nonlinear optimization.
Pattern search methods [4, 14] have been widely used because of their simplicity and the
fact that they work well in practice on a variety of problems. More recently, they are provably
convergent [16, 9].
Pattern search starts at an initial point and samples the objective function at a predeter-
mined pattern of points centered about that point with the goal of producing a new better
iterate. Such moves are referred to as exploratory moves, Figure 7(a) shows an example
pattern in 2. If such sampling is successful (i.e., produces a new better iterate), the process
is repeated with the pattern centered about the new best point. If not, the size of the pat-
tern is reduced and the objective function is again sampled about the current point. For a
detailed discussion on pattern search refer to [16, 9]. To improve the performance of pattern
search the objective function c(Si+i)isapproximated by smooth sigmoid functions. The
objective function is approximated as follows:

 c(Si + i)=
1
n
n 
j=1
Sigmoid(f,ref)(sij + ij)
where Sigmoid(,)(x) is a sigmoid function with parameters (,), shown in Figure 7(b), is
dened as (1  (1 + e(x))1).
Constraints could be handled using the techniques discussed earlier. However, pattern
search can easily handle the constraints by limiting the exploratory moves to only the direc-
tions that end up in the feasible space; thus ensuring that the generated solution is feasible.
For a more detailed discussion refer to [16]. The systematic behavior of pattern search
and the adaptable pattern size leads to the fast convergence to optimal feasible solutions.
However, pattern search is not guaranteed to nd a global optimum. This problem can be
overcome by starting the algorithm from dierent initial feasible points. For the sake of com-
parison, we conducted an experiment using normally distributed data where the tail count
c(Si + i)w as maximized and minimized using both pattern search and GA with interval
constraints. Both algorithms were restricted to use an equal number of objective function
evaluations. Figure 8 reports the results of this experiment, which shows that pattern search
generates better optimized tail counts, and thus better separation between the maximization
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Figure 7: (a) Example pattern for coordinate search in 2, as part of a larger grid. (b)
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and minimization results. However, if GA is given more functional evaluations converges to
global optimum solutions.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
Data Set
MAX GA
MIN GA
MAX PS
MIN PS
Figure 8: Comparison between GA and Pattern search (PS) for the same number of func-
tional evaluations.
5.4 Watermark Embedding Algorithm
A watermark is a set of l bits W = bl1,...,b 0 that are to be embedded in the data par-
titions {S0,...,S m  1}. T o enable multiple embeddings of the watermark in the data set
15the watermark length l is selected such that l 	 m. The watermark embedding algo-
rithm embeds a bit bi in partition Sk such that k mod l = i. This technique ensures that
each watermark bit is embedded 
m
l  times in the data set D. The watermark embedding
algorithm is reported in Figure 9. The watermark embedding algorithm generates the par-
titions by calling get partitions, then for each partition Sk a watermark bit bi is encoded
by using the single bit encoding algorithm (encode single bit) that was discussed in the
previous sections. The generated altered partition SW
k is inserted into watermarked data
set DW. Statistics (Xmax,X min) are collected after each bit embedding and are used by the
get optimal threshold algorithm to compute the optimal decoding threshold; these details
will be discussed further in the following sections.
Algorithm: embed watermark
Input: Data set D, Secret Key Ks, Number of partitions m, Watermark W = {b0,...,b l  1}
Output: Watermarked data set DW, Optimal Decoding Threshold T
1. DW,X max,X min { }
2. S0,...,S m  1get partitions(D,Ks,m)
3. for each Partition Sk
4. i  km o dl
5. SW
k  encode single bit(bi,S k,c,X max,X min)
6. insert SW
k into DW
7. T  get optimal thershold(Xmax,X min)
8. return DW, T
Figure 9: Watermark embedding algorithm
6 Decoding Threshold Evaluation
In the previous sections we discussed the bit encoding technique which embeds a watermark
bit bi in a partition Si to generate a watermarked partition SW
i . In this section, we discuss
the bit decoding technique which is used to extract the embedded watermark bit bi from
the partition SW
i . The bit decoding technique is based on an optimal threshold T  that
minimizes the probability of decoding error. The evaluation of such optimal threshold is
discussed in this section.
Presented with the data partition SW
i the bit decoding technique computes the hiding
16function (SW
i ) and compares it to the optimal decoding threshold T  to decode the
embedded bit bi.I f   ( S W
i) i s g reater than T  then the decoded bit is 1 otherwise the
decoded bit is 0. For example, using the hiding function described in Section 5.1 the decoding
technique computes the normalized tail count of SW
i by computing the reference ref and
by counting the number of entries in SW
i that are greater than ref. Then the computed
normalized tail count is compared to T , see Figure 10. The decoding technique is simple;
however, the value of the threshold T  should be carefully calculated so as to minimize the
probability of bit decoding error as will be discussed in this section.
T* 0
Bit = 1 Bit = 0
1
Figure 10: Threshold based decoding scheme.
The probability of bit decoding error is dened as the probability of an embedded bit
decoded incorrectly. The decoding threshold T  is selected such that it minimizes the prob-
ability of decoding error. The bit embedding stage discussed in Section 5.1 is based on
the maximization or minimization of the tail count; these optimized hiding function val-
ues computed during the encoding stage are used to compute the optimum threshold T .
The maximized hiding function values corresponding to b
is equal to 1 are stored in the set
Xmax. Similarly the minimized hiding function values are stored in Xmin, (see algorithm in
Figure 4).
Let Perr, P0,a n dP 1represent the probability of decoding error, the probability of en-
coding a bit = 0 and the probability of encoding a bit = 1 respectively. Furthermore, let
be, bd,a n df ( x )r epresent the encoded bit, decoded bit, and a probability density function
respectively. Perr is calculated as follows:
Perr = P(bd =0 ,b e=1 )+P( b d=1 ,b e=0 )
=P( b d=0 | b e=1 ) P 1+P( b d=1 | b e=0 ) P 0
=P( x<T| b e=1 ) P 1+P( x>T| b e=0 ) P 0
=P 1
 T

f(x|be =1 ) dx + P0
 
T
f(x|be =0 ) dx
17To minimize the probability of decoding error (Perr) with respect to the threshold T we take
the rst order derivative of Perr with respect to T to locate the optimal threshold T ,a s
follows:
	Perr
	T
= P1
	
	T
 T

f(x|be =1 ) dx + P0
	
	T
 
T
f(x|be =0 ) dx
= P1f(T|be =1 )P 0 f( T| b e=0 )
The distributions f(x|be =0 )a n df ( x | b e=1 )a re estimated from the statistics of the sets
Xmin and Xmax respectively. From our experimental observations of Xmin and Xmax the
distributions f(x|be =0 )a n df ( x | b e=1 )p ass the chi-square test of normality and thus
can be estimated as Gaussian distributions N(µ0, 0)a n dN ( µ 1 , 1)respectively. However,
the following analysis can still be performed with other types of distributions. P0 could
be estimated by
|Xmin|
|Xmax|+|Xmin| and P1 =1P 0 . S ubstituting the Gaussian expressions for
f(x|be =0 )a n df( x | b e=1 )t he rst order derivative of Perr is as follows:
	Perr
	T
=
P1
1

2

exp(
(T  µ1)2
22
0
) 
P0
0

2

exp(
(T  µ0)2
22
0
)
By equating the rst order derivative of Perr to zero we get the following quadratic equation
the roots of which include the optimal threshold T  that minimizes Perr. The second order
derivative of Perr is evaluated at T  to ensure that the second order necessary condition
(
2Perr(T)
T2 > 0) is met.
2
0  2
1
22
02
1
T
2 +
µ02
1  µ12
0
2
02
1
T
 + ln
P01
P10

+
µ2
12
0  µ2
02
1
22
02
1
=0
F r om the above analysis the selection of the optimal T  is based on the collected output
statistics of the watermark embedding algorithm. The optimal threshold T  minimizes the
probability of decoding error and thus enhances the strength of the embedded watermark by
increasing the chances of successful decoding. To show the high dependency of the probability
of decoding error and the choice of decoding threshold T , we conducted an experiment using
real life1 data with usability constraints of ±10% of the original data value. The histograms
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Figure 11: (a) Shows f(x|be =0 ) ,f( x | b e=1 )a nd the computed T  =0 . 2349. (b) Gaussian
approximation and experimental values of Perr for dierent decoding threshold (T) values.
and the Gaussian estimates of Xmax and Xmin obtained from the experiment are reported in
Figure 11(a). The optimal computed threshold T  is indicated by the dotted vertical line.
As we can see from Figure 11(a) the two distributions are far apart which is a direct result
of using the competing objects for bi equal to 1 and 0. Figure 11(b), shows the probability
of decoding error for dierent values of the decoding threshold, which shows the presence
of an optimal threshold that minimizes the probability of decoding error. Furthermore,
Figure 11(b) shows both the Gaussian approximation and the experimental values of the
probability of decoding error, which shows that the Gaussian approximation matches the
experimental results.
The probability of decoding error is also dependent on the usability constraints. If the
usability constraints are tight the amount of alterations to the data set D may not be enough
for the watermark insertion. Figure 12 shows the result of an experiment where the minimum
probability of decoding error was computed for data subject to dierent usability constraints.
The overall watermark probability of decoding error is reduced by embedding the watermark
multiple times in the data set, which is basically a repetition error correcting code.
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Figure 12: The minimum Perr at T  for dierent usability constraints
7 Watermark Detection
In this section we discuss the watermark detection algorithm which extracts the embedded
watermark using the secret parameters including Ks, m, , c, T. The algorithm starts by
generating the data partitions {S0,...,S m  1}using the watermarked data set DW, the secret
key Ks and the number of partitions m as input to the data partitioning algorithm discussed
in Section 4. Each partition encodes a single watermark bit; to extract the embedded bit
we use the threshold decoding scheme based on the optimal threshold T that minimizes the
probability of decoding error as discussed in Section 6. If the partition size is smaller than
 the bit is decoded as an erasure, otherwise it is decoded using the threshold scheme.
As the watermark W = bl1,...,b 0 is embedded several times in the data set each
watermark bit is extracted several times where for a bit bi it is extracted from partition Sk
where k mod l = i. The extracted bits are decoded using the majority voting technique
which is used in the decoding of repetition error correcting codes. Each bit bi is extracted
m
l times so it represents a 
m
l -fold repetition code [19]. The majority voting technique is
illustrated by the example in Figure 13. The detailed algorithm used for watermark detection
is reported in Figure 14.
In case of a relation with multiple attributes the watermark resilience can be increased by
embedding the watermark in multiple attributes. This is a simple extension to the presented
encoding and decoding techniques in which the watermark is embedded in each attributed
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Figure 13: An example illustrates the majority bit matching decoding algorithm for a wa-
termark W = 011010, with × representing the erasures.
separately. For a  attribute relation, the watermark bit is embedded in each of the  columns
separately using the bit embedding technique discussed in Section 5.1. The use of multiple
attributes enables the multiple embedding of watermark bits  times in each partition, such
embedding can be considered as an inner -fold repetition code. For decoding purposes the
statistics Xmax and Xmin are collected for each attribute separately. The optimal threshold
is computed for each attribute using the collected statistics to minimize the probability of
decoding error as discussed in Section 6. In the decoding phase, the watermark is extracted
separately from each of the  attributes using the discussed watermark detection algorithm,
then majority voting is used to detect the nal watermark.
8 Attacker Model
In this section we discuss the attacker model and the possible malicious attacks that can
be performed. Assume, Alice is the owner of the data set D and has marked D by using a
watermark W to generate a watermarked data set DW. The attacker Mallory can perform
several types of attacks in the hope of corrupting or even deleting the embedded watermark.
A robust watermarking technique must be able to survive all such attacks.
We assume that Mallory has no access to the original data set D and does not know any
of the secret information used in the embedding of the watermark, including the secret key
21Algorithm: detect watermark
Input: Watermarked data set DW, m, c, , Ks, T, Watermark length l
Output: Detected watermark WD
1. set ones[0,...,l1]  0
2. set zeros[0,...,l1]  0
3. S0,...,S m  1get partitions(DW,K s,m)
4. for j =0 ,...,m1
5. if |Sj|
6. i  jm o dl
7. value  (Sj,0,c)
8. if value  T
9. ones[i]  ones[i]+1
10. else
11. zeros[i]  zeros[i]+1
12. for j =0 ,...,l1
13. if ones[j] >z e r o s [ j ]
14. WD[j]  1
15. else if ones[j] <z e r o s [ j ]
16. WD[j]  0
17. else
18. WD[j] ×
19. return WD
Figure 14: Watermark detection algorithm
Ks, the secret number of partitions m, the secret constant c, the optimization parameters
and the optimal decoding threshold T . Given these assumptions Mallory cannot generate
the data partitions {S0,...,S m  1} because this requires the knowledge of both the secret
key Ks and the number of partitions m, thus Mallory cannot intentionally attack certain
watermark bits. Moreover, any data manipulations executed by Mallory cannot be checked
against the usability constraints because the original data set D is unknown. Under these
assumptions Mallory is faced with the dilemma of trying to destroy the watermark and at
the same time of not destroying the data. We classify the attacks preformed by Mallory into
three types, namely deletion, alteration and insertion attacks.
Deletion Attack: Mallory deletes  tuples from the marked data set. If the tuples are ran-
domly deleted, then on average each partition loses 
m tuples. The watermarking techniques
available in literature rely on special tuples, referred to as marker tuples. Agrawal et al. [1]
use marker tuples to locate the embedded bit and Sion et al. [23] use marker tuples to locate
the start and end of data partitions. The embedded watermark is a stream of bits where
22the marker tuples identify the boundaries between these bits in the stream. The successful
deletion of marker tuples deletes these boundaries between the bits of the watermark stream,
which makes such marker based watermarking techniques [1, 23] susceptible to watermark
synchronization error. For example, using the watermarking technique presented by Sion et
al. [23], Figure 15(a) shows an example partitioned data set and the corresponding majority
voting map used to decode the embedded watermark. The marker tuples are represented
by the shaded cells; these markers are used to identify the start and end of each partition.
The embedded bit is noted in each partition; the embedded watermark is 101010. Now
if Mallory successfully deletes the marker tuple controlling the rst bit (b0), this results in
the deletion of the rst bit, see Figure 15(b). The decoder, unaware of the deleted bit, will
generate ×10101 instead, which is the result of decoding a shifted version of the embedded
bits. This results in a watermark synchronization error at the decoder, see Figure 15(b).
Moreover, the resynchronization of the watermark bit stream becomes more complicated in
the presence of ipped bits due to other decoding errors. Thus the successful deletion of
a single marker could result in a large number of errors in the decoding phase. To avoid
watermark synchronization errors in marker based techniques the m marker tuples should
be stored, as indicated by Sion et al. in [23]. Note that this violates the requirement that
the watermark decoding is blinded.
On the other hand, our partitioning technique is resilient to such synchronization errors
as it does not rely on marker tuples to locate the partition limits; instead our partitioning
technique assigns tuples to partitions based a dierent approach as discussed in Section 4.
We also use erasures to indicate the loss of a bit due to insucient partition size and thus
to maintain synchronization and ensure that our technique is resilient to the watermark
synchronization error.
Alteration Attack: In this attack Mallory alters the data value of  tuples. Here Mallory
is faced with the challenge that altering the data may disturb the watermark; however at the
same time Mallory does not have access to the original data set D, thus may easily violate the
usability constraints and render the data useless. The alteration attack basically perturbs the
data in hope of introducing errors in the embedded watermark bits. The attacker is trying
to move the hiding function values from the left of the optimal threshold to the right and
23vice versa. However, using the conicting objectives in encoding the watermark bits, that is
the maximizing the tail count for bi = 1 and minimizing the tail count for bi = 0, maximizes
the distance between the hiding function values in both cases; thus it makes it more dicult
for the attacker to alter the embedded bit. In addition, by the repeated embedding of the
watermark and the use of majority voting technique discussed in Section 7 this attack can
easily be mitigated.
Insertion Attack: Mallory decides to insert  tuples to the data set DW hoping to perturb
the embedded watermark. The insertion of new tuples acts as additive noise to the embedded
watermark. However, the watermark embedding is not based on a single tuple and is based on
a cumulative hiding function that operates on all the tuples in the partition. Thus the eect
of adding tuples is a minor perturbation to the value of the hiding function and thus to the
embedded watermark bit. Marker-based watermarking techniques may suer badly from this
attack because the addition of tuples may introduce new markers in the data set and thus lead
to the addition of new bits in the embedded watermark sequence. Consequently, this results
in watermark synchronization error. Using the example mentioned earlier, Figure 15(a)
shows a partitioned data set and its corresponding majority voting map using the Sion et al.
technique [23], where the embedded watermark is 101010. Now if Mallory successfully adds
a marker tuple after the third marker tuple, this results in the addition of a new bit between
(b2)a n d( b 3 ); see Figure 15(c) where the black cell represents the added marker tuple. The
decoder, unaware of the added bit, will generate 010111 instead, which is the result of
decoding a shifted version of the embedded bits. This problem is further complicated in the
presence of bit errors in the watermark stream. To ensure synchronization at the decoder
the marker based watermarking techniques require the storage of the m marker tuples to
ensure successful partitioning of the dataset in the presence of the insertion attack [23].
On the other hand, our partitioning algorithm is not dependent on special marker tuples
which makes it resilient to such attack, and watermark synchronization is guaranteed during
decoding.
The experimental results presented in Section 9 support the claims made about the
resilience of our watermarking technique to all the above attacks.
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(a) Watermarked dataset
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(c) After insertion attack
Figure 15: Watermarked dataset subject to the deletion and insertion attacks repectively,
and their corresponding majority voting maps. Grey shaded cells represent the original
marker tuples and the black cells represent the added marker tuples.
9 Experimental Results
In this section we report the results of an extensive experimental study that analyzes the
resilience of the proposed watermarking scheme to the attacks described in Section 8. All
the experiments were performed on Intel Pentium IV CPU 3.2GHz with 512MB RAM. We
use real-life data from a relatively small database that contains the daily power consumption
rates of some customers over a period of one year. Such data sets are made available through
the CIMEG2 project. The database size is approximately 5 Megabytes; for testing purposes
only a subset of the original data is used with 150000 tuples. We used c = 75%, a 16 bit
watermark, a minimum partition size  = 10, a number of partitions m = 2048, the data
2CIMEG: Consortium for the Intelligent Management of the Electric Power Grid.
http://helios.ecn.purdue.edu/cimeg.
25change was allowed within ±10%. The pattern search algorithm was used for the optimiza-
tion. The optimal threshold was computed using the technique used in Section 6 to minimize
the probability of decoding error. The watermarked data set was subject to dierent types
of attacks including deletion, alteration, and addition attacks. The results were averaged
over multiple runs. Similar results were obtained for both uniform and normally distributed
synthetic data. We show that it is dicult for Mallory to remove or alter the watermark
without destroying the data.
We assessed computation times and observed a polynomial behavior with respect to the
input data size. Given the setup described above, with a local database we obtained an
average of around 300 tuples/second for watermark embedding, while detection turned out
to be at least approximately ve times as fast. This occurs in the non-optimized, interpreted
Java proof of concept implementation. We expect major orders of magnitude speedups in a
real-life deployment version.
9.1 Deletion Attack
In this attack Mallory randomly drops  tuples from the watermarked data set, the water-
mark is then decoded and watermark loss is measured for dierent  values. Furthermore, in
this test we compare our implementation with the marker based approach by Sion et al. [23].
Figure 16 shows the experimental results; they clearly show that our watermarking technique
is resilient to the random deletion attack. Using our technique the watermark was success-
fully extracted with 100% accuracy even when over 85% of the tuples were deleted. On the
other hand, the technique by Sion et al. badly deteriorates when only 10% of the tuples
were deleted. We believe that high resilience of our watermarking technique is due to the
marker-free data partitioning algorithm that is resilient to the watermark synchronization
errors caused by the tuple deletion.
Because our technique is highly resilient to tuple deletion attacks the watermark can be
retrieved from a small sample of the data. This important property combined with the high
eciency of our watermark detection algorithm makes it possible to develop tools able to
eectively and eciently search the web to detect illegal copies of data. We could think of
an agent-based tool where the agent visits sites and selectively tests parts of the stored data
26sets to check for ownership rights. Such a technique would only need inspect 15% of the
data for successful watermark detection.
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Figure 16: Resilience to deletion attack.
9.2 Insertion Attack
In this experiment Mallory attempts to add a number  of tuples hoping to weaken the
embedded watermark. However, by adding tuples to the current data Mallory is adding
meaningless data to the current data. Mallory could simply generate the new tuples by
replicating values in randomly selected existing tuples; we refer to such attack as the -
selected insertion attack. Mallory could randomly generate the tuple values by generating
random data from the range (µDW  DW,µ D W +DW), where µDW and DW are the
mean and standard deviation of the data set DW respectively. We refer to such attack as
the (,)-insertion attack. Figure 17(a) shows a comparison between our approach and the
marker based approach by Sion et al. The comparison shows that our technique is resilient
to -selected attack even when  is up to 100% of the data set size. Figure 17(b) shows
the resilience of our watermarking technique to (,)-insertion attack, where the watermark
was recovered with 100% accuracy even when up to 85% of the data set size tuples were
inserted.
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(a) -selected insertion attack
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Figure 17: (a) Resilience to -selected insertion attack. (b) Resilience to (,)-insertion
attack
9.3 Alteration Attack
We tested our watermarking technique against two types of alteration attacks namely the
xed and the random (,) alter attacks. In the xed-(,) alter attack Mallory randomly
selects  tuples and alters them by multiplying 
2 tuples by exactly (1 +) and the other 
2
tuples by (1). In this attack, the value of  is xed. In the random-(,) alter attack 
tuples are randomly selected; 
2 tuples are then multiplied by (1+x) and the other 
2 tuples
by (1  x), where x is a uniform random variable in the range [0,].
Figures 18(a)(b)(c) show the behavior of our watermarking technique subject to the
xed-(,) alter attack. As we can see from Figure 18(a) the watermark is decoded with
100% accuracy even when 100% of the tuples are altered by >10%. This shows the
strong resilience of our watermarking technique to xed alteration attacks. Furthermore,
Figure 18(b) shows the number of corrupted tuples as the attack proceeds. Tuples that
exceed the usability constraints are referred to as corrupted tuples. Figure 18(b) shows that
after >10% a sudden increase in the number of corrupted tuples; such an increase is due
to the usability constraints used in this experiment, which are set to ±10%. Figure 18(c)
is a clear description of the dilemma that the attacker is facing. The dotted lines show
the number of corrupted tuples, while the solid lines are represent the detected watermark
accuracy. By increasing  the attacker is able to corrupt the watermark to 85% accuracy,
however, at the same time 50% of the tuples are corrupted. Similar results were experienced
28for the random-(,) attack which are shown in Figures 18(d)(e)(f).
Experiments performed at lower usability constraints still showed similar resilience trends
of the watermark encoding and decoding when subject to above attacks. Table 1 shows a
comparison between our technique and Sion et al. technique based on the dierent watermark
attacks and main characteristics of each technique.
Table 1: Comparison between our technique and the technique by Sion et al. [23].
Our Technique Sion et al. Technique
Deletion Attack Resilient to random tuple deletion at-
tack; 100% watermark accuracy even
when more than 85% of the tuples are
deleted.
Not resilient to random tuple deletion
attack; watermark accuracy deteriorates
to 50% when only 10% of the tuples are
deleted.
Insertion Attack Resilient to random tuple insertion at-
tacks; 100% watermark accuracy even
when more than 100% of the original
number of tuples is inserted in the -
insertion attack and similar watermark
accuracy when subject to the (,)-
insertion attacks.
Not resilient to random tuple insertion
attacks; watermark accuracy deterio-
rates to 50% when only 10% of the tu-
ples are inserted.
Alteration Attack Resilient to random tuple alteration;
100% watermark accuracy even when
100% of the tuples are altered by >
10% and >20% for the xed-(,)
and random-(,) attacks respectively.
The watermark embedding technique
exploits the feasible alteration space by
solving an optimization problem to en-
force the competing objectives based on
the bit to be inserted. Furthermore,
decoding threshold is computed based
on the embedding statistics to maximize
the probability of decoding error.
It is not clear how the bit embedding
is performed; no systematic alteration
scheme is dened that investigates the
feasible embedding space. Thresholds
are not based on embedding statistics
and are chosen arbitrarily by the user
without any optimality criteria.
Synchronization
Error
Not vulnerable to such error, because
the technique does not require special
marker tuples for the correct partition
reconstruction.
Highly vulnerable to such error, due to
the dependency on special marker tuples
to locate partitions. Requires the stor-
age of all m marker tuples for the correct
partition reconstruction.
Decoding
Threshold
Uses an optimal threshold T that min-
imizes the probability of decoding error.
Uses two decoding thresholds which are
arbitrarily decided by the user without
any optimality criteria.
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Figure 18: Resilience to xed-(,) and random-(,) alter attacks. 3010 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a resilient watermarking technique for relational data that
embeds watermark bits in the data statistics. The watermarking problem was formulated as
a constrained optimization problem, that maximizes or minimizes a hiding function based
on the bit to be embedded. Genetic algorithm and pattern search techniques were employed
to solve the proposed optimization problem and to handle the constraints. Furthermore,
we presented a data partitioning technique that does not depend on special marker tuples
to locate the partitions and proved its resilience to watermark synchronization errors. We
developed an ecient threshold-based technique for watermark detection that is based on
an optimal threshold that minimizes the probability of decoding error. The watermark
resilience was improved by the repeated embedding of the watermark and using majority
voting technique in the watermark decoding phase. Moreover, the watermark resilience was
improved by using multiple attributes.
A proof of concept implementation of our watermarking technique was used to conduct
experiments using both synthetic and real-world data. A comparison our watermarking
technique with previously-posed techniques techniques shows the superiority of our technique
to deletion, alteration and insertion attacks.
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